William & Mary Law Review
Volume 47 (2005-2006)
Issue 6

Article 5

April 2006

The Political Economy of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal
Defense
Ronald F. Wright
Wayne A. Logan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Legal Profession Commons

Repository Citation
Ronald F. Wright and Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees for Indigent
Criminal Defense, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2045 (2006), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/
vol47/iss6/5
Copyright c 2006 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF APPLICATION FEES FOR
INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE
RONALD

F. WRIGHT* & WAYNE A. LOGAN**
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ........................................

2046

I. THE SPREAD OF INDIGENT DEFENSE FEE LAWS ..........
A. Extent and Variety of Application Fees ..............
B. The Application Fee Trend .......................
II. POLITICAL ORIGINS OF APPLICATION FEE STATUTES .....
A. The Defense Establishmentand Application Fees .....
B. Debate Themes .................................
C. PoliticalTheory and Internal Defense-Side Politics . ..

2049
2052
2054
2055
2055
2059
2068
2072

III. JUDICIAL RESPONSES ..............................
IV. FEES AND WAIVER RATES ...........................
CONCLUSION .........................................

2077
2086

Professor of Law, Wake Forest University.
** Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. Special thanks to Rachel Barkow,
Darryl Brown, Marc Miller, and Ric Simmons for their helpful comments on a preliminary
version of the Article. We also thank Patrick Tamer, Statistical Program Analyst, North
Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts, and Craig Hagensick, Research Analyst, Court
Services Division of the Minnesota Supreme Court, for their tireless efforts in securing the
data reported in this Article, and Sarah Boswell-Healey, Helen Jugovic, Lani Mark, Ben
Shankle, and Stephen Sarazin for their excellent research assistance.
*

2045

2046

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:2045

INTRODUCTION

State and local governments spend serious money every year to
hire lawyers for criminal defendants who cannot otherwise afford
their own attorneys. Like all the other big-ticket items in a public
budget, this one is revealing. Funding for this politically unpopular
yet necessary government service must go through the legislative
appropriations process, year in and year out, producing an instructive case study in crime politics.
Legislators who draft the criminal justice portions of the state
budget routinely express the hope that the government can control
the expense of indigent criminal defense. One method of doing so
involves recovering part of the attorneys' fees from the defendants
themselves. Some defendants, although they may qualify for
appointed counsel under the state's standards for indigency, still
have the financial means to pay for part of their defense, or will be
in a position to do so in the future, allowing the state to recoup some
of its expenses after the case ends.
But these traditional "recoupment" statutes require a great deal
of judicial effort to sort the truly indigent from those with more
resources, and considerable administrative effort to track defendants over time and collect the monies piecemeal. The disappointing
revenues collected under recoupment statutes have led many states,
since the early 1990s, to experiment with a different cost-control
technique: statutes that instruct courts to assess up-front "application fees," typically in the range of $25 to $100.' The fees are
charged automatically to criminal defendants, who, despite their
demonstrated poverty, are expected to "pay as they go," often
without regard for the outcome of their case. The fees, imposed on
the front end of the criminal prosecution process, do not create the
same administrative burdens as the more income-sensitive "recoupment" procedures, yet they enjoy many of the same policy and
political benefits. As we explain in Part I, they have now spread to
over half the states.

1. See infra Part I.A.
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These application fee statutes follow a typical route through the
legislative process. Part II portrays this process as an internal
struggle among defense lawyers, in particular between the leadership and the rank-and-file attorneys who work in organizations
that provide legal services to indigent criminal defendants. Instead
of the archetypal political debate between prosecution and defenseoriented advocates, this debate plays out within the ranks of defense
providers, in the process revealing differences in priorities and
professional self-images, and ultimately, varied notions of what best
serves the interests of indigent defendants.
Counterintuitively, it is defense organizations themselves that
often initiate the idea of application fees, generally during a time of
budgetary stress for a defender program. The high-level administrators who deal with budgets and negotiate with legislators tend to
favor the fees from an institutional perspective. The application fees
not only hold the promise of increasing revenue, but also to secure
legislative goodwill by showing a willingness to contain costs and
possibly impose a measure of personal responsibility among the
client base. From the vantage point of the leadership, operating a
program within harsh budgetary and political limits, the choice to
endorse application fees is a natural one, and the endorsement of
the concept might be more important for their purposes than the
actual collection of fees. As for the effects of fees on prospective
clients, defense organization leaders tend to downplay-without any
direct empirical support-the burden on their impecunious clients.
Resistance to fees inevitably comes from lower in the defense
ranks, from attorneys who represent indigents and view matters
from an individual client perspective rather than an institutional
vantage point. Perceiving themselves to be at the ramparts of
the hallowed ideals of Gideon v. Wainwright,2 they stand for
uncompromised principles of government responsibility to the
criminally prosecuted poor and rely on supposition and anecdotal
evidence to assert that the fees, while comparatively small, will chill
many defendants' willingness to request a lawyer.
These objections from the field operators of the defense organizations, however, usually give way to budgetary and political
imperatives. The defense establishment, like other bureaucracies,
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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takes its policy direction from the top. Faced with the right
combination of budgetary and political woes, a defense organization
will bow to necessity (as seen by its leaders) and adopt a policy to
collect application fees.
Part III tracks the fate of application fee laws after the formal
policy takes effect. This is the juncture where rank-and-file defense
actors, quelled in the legislative debates, push back. In individual
cases and strategic test cases alike, publicly appointed defense
counsel file legal challenges. In ruling on these challenges, courts
offer their own reactions to the application fee statutes: in two
instances to date, state supreme courts have invalidated the laws on
constitutional grounds.3
An equally important judicial reaction, however, occurs at the
trial level. Trial judges draft rules and establish courtroom routines
that determine the real impact of the application fee statutes. In
conjunction with rank-and-file defense attorneys who see the issue
more from the vantage point of individual defendants, judges in
local courtrooms enjoy the capacity to create broad de facto limits on
the reach of the fee statutes. Although the upper-tier defense
advocates align themselves with legislators (and prosecutors), the
lower-tier defense advocates find their allies among the ranks of
trial judges.
The defendant's waiver decision plays a starring role in all these
debates and reactions to the application fee laws. Both the legislative debates and the judicial responses to fee laws are based on
speculative assertions about the waiver decisions of defendants. Yet
in the application fee context, and particularly when it comes to
misdemeanors (which make up the vast majority of criminal
charges), surprisingly little is known about waiver of counsel,
including such basic facts as the number of criminal defendants who
waive their legal right to appointed counsel and why they do so.
Powerful reasons exist to believe that an application fee could
seriously affect a defendant's waiver decision, starting with
anecdotal evidence from attorneys and judges who report increases
in waivers after the application fee statutes take effect. Careful
studies of the effects of "co-pay" systems in other settings, such as
medical insurance, also suggest that the effect on waiver of counsel
3. See infra Part III.
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could be significant. Nevertheless, in Part IV we assemble data to
suggest that application fee laws have only muted effects on waiver
decisions. By tracking the level of counsel waiver in recent years in
two jurisdictions that passed application fee statutes, we find little
or no evidence that the fees increased the number of waivers during
the target period.
Perhaps the administrators of indigent defense organizations who
support the application fees are correct: defendants do not consider
the fees to be large enough to affect their waiver decisions. We
believe a better explanation, however, builds on the power of trial
actors to neutralize the effects of any new criminal justice policy, at
least in the short run. Application fee statutes matter far less in
practice than the political debate might indicate because the triallevel actors remain unsympathetic to them and implement them in
ways that blunt their effects. Their power to refract the effects of
such policies is especially strong in the high-volume world of
misdemeanor courts. In this context, as in so many others in
criminal justice, having the last word can matter the most.
I. THE SPREAD OF INDIGENT DEFENSE FEE LAWS
The right of indigents to have government-funded counsel dates
back to Gideon v. Wainwright4 (for felonies) and before that to
Powell v. Alabama' (for capital crimes). In both decisions, the
Supreme Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment, although it
does not require the government to sponsor defense attorneys in all
prosecutions,6 compels the states in serious criminal cases to
provide attorneys for defendants too poor to pay.7 Subsequently, the
4. Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.

5. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing only that "[uin all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence," not that
counsel be state funded). Under English common law, criminal defendants had a right to
counsel in misdemeanor but not felony cases; only in 1836 were accused felons in England
allowed counsel. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821-26 (1975). By the time of the
framing of the U.S. Constitution, twelve of the thirteen original states rejected their forebears'
rule and recognized the right to counsel in almost all criminal prosecutions. See Powell, 287
U.S. at 64-65. For more on this history, see Ronald F. Wright, ParityofResources for Defense
Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REv. 219, 226-27 (2004).

7. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341; Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. In 1938, the Court held that the
Sixth Amendment required counsel in all federal criminal proceedings. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
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Court expanded the right to include defendants accused of any
criminal offense if conviction could "end up in the actual deprivation
of a person's liberty."'
This affirmative constitutional obligation, unlike others such as
the warnings that the police must provide criminal suspects under
Miranda v. Arizona,9 sends powerful annual shock waves through
state budgets.' ° As the Supreme Court has expanded the right over
time, and states themselves have made appointed counsel more
available," the fiscal impact of appointed counsel has increased. 2
Currently, 82% of felony defendants in large states utilize publicly
funded counsel;' 3 and while the Supreme Court has acknowledged
U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938).
8. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40
(1972). The right also extends to felony preliminary hearings, see Coleman v. Alabama, 399
U.S. 1, 9 (1970), sentencing proceedings, see Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967), and
appeals of right from convictions, see Halbert v. Michigan, 125 S. Ct. 2582, 2586 (2005);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963). No right to appointed counsel extends,
however, to instances when only a criminal fine is imposed (not prison or jail), see Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,368,373-74 (1979), and to discretionary appeals, see Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. 600, 610 (1974).
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. Of course, the nonfiscal consequences of Miranda, as well as numerous other
constitutional safeguards the Court has imposed on states, have long been debated. See, e.g.,
Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs:An EmpiricalReassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387,
391 (1996) (suggesting that Miranda has prevented confessions in approximately one out of
every six cases).
11. See B. Mitchell Simpson, III, A FairTrial:Are Indigents Chargedwith Misdemeanors
Entitled to CourtAppointedCounsel?, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 417,418-19 (2000) (noting
that fifteen or fewer U.S. jurisdictions provide only the bare minimum of counsel coverage
prescribed by the Supreme Court). While courts have seen fit to expand the scope of the right,
legislatures have shown a ready willingness to offset such increases by lowering financial
eligibility thresholds, thereby shrinking the overall pool of mandated counsel appointments.
See, e.g., FIA: STAT. ANN. § 27.52(4)(a)(1) (West 2005) (declaring that a defendant is indigent
if his income is "equal to or below 200 percent of the then-current federal poverty guidelines"
or if the defendant is receiving specified government assistance for the needy). Because of the
wide variations in state standards for indigency, as noted by one commentator, "Gideon means
something different in Alabama than it does in Florida." Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible
Pillarof Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571, 572 (2005).
12. Between 1982 and 1999, for instance, data from twenty-one states showed that state
spending on appointed counsel increased more than two and one-half times in terms of
inflation-adjusted dollars. See CAROL J. DEFRANcES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE-FUNDED INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, 1999, at 2 (2001), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdffsfids99.pdf.
13. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLoW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE,
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000), availableat httpJ/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/dccc.pdf.
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the associated costs, 4 federal money has never arrived to fully fund
the federal constitutional mandate. 5 As a result, state and local
governments foot the bill mostly by themselves, 6 annually spending
millions to fulfill their constitutional obligation to fund indigent

defense. '7
In the 1990s, the combination of budgetary shortfalls and
constitutional challenges to underfunded indigent defense systems
that threatened even larger future expenses 8 forced state legislatures to take action. They pursued various alternate funding
mechanisms for indigent criminal defense. In keeping with the
privatization strategies increasingly in vogue, 19 many states tried to
trim their criminal defense budgets by shifting the costs of such
14. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 141 (1972) (recognizing that the expansion of the
right to counsel has "heightened the burden on public revenues").
15. See DEFRANCES, supra note 12, at 1 (noting that over 90% of funding for appointed
counsel in each of twenty-one states included in the report originates from nonfederal
sources). As Darryl Brown recently observed, while the "Court is rigorous about protecting the
formal right to counsel [it] barely regulates the quality of counsel." Darryl K. Brown, The
Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in CriminalAdjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV.
1585, 1603 (2005) (footnote omitted).
16. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 42 (2004)
[hereinafter BROKEN PROMISE], available at httpJ/www.abanet.org/legalservicessclaid/
defender/brokenpromiselfullreport.pdf (noting that "virtually no federal funds are allocated
for defense services in the fifty states").
17. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT

DEFENSE SERVICES IN FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 35 (2003), available at http'//www.abanet.
org/legalservices/downloads/sclaidfmdigentdefense/indigentdefexpend2003 .pdf(reporting that
in 2002 state and local expenditures for indigent defense exceeded $2.8 billion). Notably,
counties play a significant part in indigent funding. See BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 16, at
8 tbl.1 (noting that in six states counties provide 90% or more of indigent defense funds). For
a discussion of the methods of providing appointed counsel such as the use of public defender
programs, rosters of private attorneys serving by appointment, and contract attorneys, see
id. at2.
18. See Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 1791-802 (1999) (book
review) (surveying state litigation over the cost of defense counsel systems). For a discussion
of the professional ethics implications on counsel because of this underfunding, see Bruce A.
Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J.
1169(2003).
19. See generally PRIVATIZING THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM: POLICE,
ADJUDICATION, AND CORRECTIONS SERVICES FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR (Gary W. Bowman et

al. eds., 1992) (arguing that privatization can benefit the criminal justice system in various
ways, such as helping to reduce court dockets and prison overcrowding). For a more general
discussion of the increasing tendency of governments to charge for services, see Laurie
Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the 'Get What You Pay For"Model of Local
Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373 (2004).
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services back to the consumers-indigent criminal defendants.
Today, cost recovery mechanisms typically take two primary forms:
(1) recoupment, a court order imposed at the conclusion of a case
for the defendant to pay an amount reflecting the actual cost of
attorney's fees, and (2) contribution (sometimes referred to as
"application fees," "co-pays," "user fees," or "administrative" or
"registration" fees), a fixed sum imposed at the time of appointment.
This Article focuses on the latter, which we refer to collectively as
application fees, the newest variety of cost-recovery mechanisms on
the criminal justice landscape.
A. Extent and Variety of Application Fees
Currently, laws in twenty-seven U.S. jurisdictions (twenty-five
states 20 and two counties2 1 ) authorize or compel judges to impose a
fee on indigent criminal defendants who seek appointed counsel.
The laws each condition appointment of counsel on payment of a fee,

20. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-584(B) (Supp. 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87213(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.5 (West Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-1-103(3) (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-298 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
29, § 4607 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52(1)(b)-(c) (West Supp. 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 1521A-6(b) (2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-7-6(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
22-4529 (2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.211(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:147(a)(1)(d) (2005); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 211D, § 2A (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 611.17 (West Supp. 2005), invalidated in part by State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403 (Minn.
2004) (invalidating mandatory fee on Sixth Amendment grounds but condoning imposition
of fee on discretionary basis); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:24-17(a) (West Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-15-12(C) (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-455.1 (2003), invalidated in part by
State v. Webb, 591 S.E.2d 505, 511 (N.C. 2004) (concluding the assessment of counsel fees on
acquitted defendants under subsection (b) violated the state constitution); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 29-07-01.1(1) (Supp. 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 120.36(A) (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 1355A (West 2003); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151.487(1) (West 2003); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 17-3-30(B) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-103(b)(1) (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5238
(1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 977.075 (West 1998). In addition, Missouri law seemingly authorizes
assessment of an application fee. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 600.090.1(1) (West 2003) (stating that
a qualified indigent can be required to pay a fee if "he is able to provide a limited cash
contribution toward the cost of his representation"). However, the provision is apparently not
being used at this time. Telephone Interview with Dan Graylike, Senior Deputy Counsel,
Office of Mo. State Pub. Defender (Aug. 28, 2005) (transcript on file with authors).
21. See Office of the Public Defender, King County, Washington, httpJ/www.metrokc.gov/
dchs/opd/FAQ.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2006) (processing fee of $25); Department of
Assigned Legal Counsel, Pierce County, Washington, http'J/www.co. pierce.wa.us/pc/abtus
ourorg/dac/legalservices.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2006) (application fee of $25).
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in amounts ranging from $10 in New Mexico to $480 in Wisconsin,22
with several states tying fee amounts to the degree of the criminal
offense charged,2 3 and others prescribing a monetary range while
permitting the trial judge to assess a defendant's relative ability to
pay. 24 Depending on statutory specifics, the fee is collected by the
court,2 5 or the public defender or other entity that screens defendants for counsel eligibility.2 6
Consistent with accepted constitutional limits, 27 none of the
application fee provisions permit counsel to be denied if a defendant
fails to pay the required fee, and laws in all states, except Florida,
allow trial judges to waive fees when a defendant is unable to pay.2"
States are free, however, to condition appointment of counsel on
future payment of the application fee and to inform defendants how
collection of that fee will happen. In Delaware, for instance, a
defendant who is unable to pay the prescribed $50 fee must report
to the Commissioner of Corrections for directions on how to
discharge the amount by means of work.2 9 In Minnesota, the fee is
subject to the Revenue Recapture Act, allowing the state to garnish
wages, seize property, file adverse credit bureau reports, and
impound vehicles.3 0 Other coercive collection techniques include
22. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-15-12(C) (West 2003); WIs. ADMIN. CODE PD § 6.01 (2005).
23. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-7-6 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005) ($50 for a misdemeanor
and $100 for a felony).
24. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-213(a)(2)(B)(i)(a) (Supp. 2005) (range from $10 to
$100); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-103 (2003) (range from $50 to $200); see also KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 31.211(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004) (allowing fee to be set "in an amount determined
by the court," which can order that payment be made in a lump sum or by installments); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 151.487(1) (West 2003) (imposing a fee if the court "finds that the person
has financial resources that enable the person to pay in full or in part the administrative costs
of determining the eligibility of the person and the costs of the legal and other services to be
provided at state expense").
25. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-7-6 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
611.17(c) (West Supp. 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-07-01.1(1) (Supp. 2005).
26. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-1-103(3) (2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-15-12(C) (West
2003).
27. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20, 24 (1956) (invalidating state law that
conditioned access to trial transcripts on appellant-defendants' ability to pay).
28. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52(1)(b)-(c) (West Supp. 2005). For a brief time in 2003,
Minnesota law also refused to allow for waiver. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17(c) (West 2003)
(repealed 2003). As discussed infra, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court deemed this
aspect of the law unconstitutional. See infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4607(d) (2003).
30. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 270A.03-04 (West 1998 & Supp. 2006).
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both the threatened revocation of probation"l and the possibility of
sentence enhancement in the event of nonpayment.3 2 Finally, in
most states, the fees are imposed regardless of whether the
defendant is convicted of the charged offense."
B. The Application Fee Trend
Application fee laws have shown significant gains in popularity
over the past decade. According to one study, in 1994 only seven
jurisdictions (six states and one county) authorized their collection;34
today's increase to twenty-seven jurisdictions (twenty-five states
and two counties) marks an increase of nearly 300% in just over ten
years. The proliferation of application fee laws reveals no geographic
pattern: states in all regions of the country have adopted laws. The
group includes states known for their progressive or liberal
positions on social matters (e.g., California and Massachusetts),
along with states with a more conservative profile (e.g., Georgia and
Kansas). Perhaps just as interesting are states such as Alabama
and Texas, places not known for coddling criminal suspects, where
the legislatures have refrained so far from adopting application fee
laws. What the jurisdictions do share, as noted next, is a predictable
political coalition in support of the laws.

31. See THE S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, "IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD A LAWYER...": A REPORT

ON GEORGIA'S FAILED INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM 41-42 (2003), availableat http'J/www.schr.
orgfmdigentdefense/articles.html.
32. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-103(b)(1) (2003) (providing that failure to pay the fee
will not result in the state refusing to appoint counsel but any "willful failure to pay such fee
may be considered by the court as an enhancement factor when imposing sentence if the
defendant is found guilty of criminal conduct").
33. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-213(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2005); § 40-14-103
(specifying the administrative fee as "nonrefundable"). But see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4529
(2004) ("If the defendant is acquitted or the case is dismissed, any application fee paid
pursuant to this section shall be remitted to the defendant."). In a handful of states,
defendants are expressly allowed to seek judicial review of a fee order. See, e.g., N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-15-12(C) (West 2003); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 151.487(5) (West 2003).
34. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, PUBLIC DEFENDER APPLICATION FEES: 2001 UPDATE

4 (2002), available at http//abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/
pdapplicationfees200l-narrative.pdf.
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II. POLITICAL ORIGINS OF APPLICATION FEE STATUTES

Application fee statutes move through the legislative process in
much the same way from state to state. Advocates of the strategy
very often hail from the leadership of organizations that provide
criminal defense lawyers to indigent defendants-a group we call
the "defense establishment." Their objectives are to avert immediate
budgetary troubles and to establish credibility with legislators and
other "repeat players" in the arena of crime politics, such as law
enforcement officials. Despite the monetary impact on individual
clients, the hope is that a stronger financial position will help the
organization in the long run to provide better representation to its
ever-growing client base.
Opposition to the idea, however, often comes from within these
defense organizations, although usually from further down in the
hierarchy, from those who more directly provide services to
individual clients. The crucial debates on the merits of application
fees, then, happen within the defense organizations themselves
rather than in the legislature. Prosecutors and law enforcement
organizations might support the laws, but they do not carry the flag
into battle. State legislatures tend not to pass these laws over the
determined and united opposition of the existing defense organizations.
This Part begins by recounting the political background of the
application fee statute in one state-North Carolina-followed by a
review of the themes from the North Carolina story that also figure
in application fee debates nationwide. We then discuss the implications of this specialized political environment, where debate within
defense-oriented organizations largely determines the legislative
outcome for a central matter in criminal justice administration.
A. The Defense Establishment and Application Fees
The idea for an application fee statute in North Carolina originated from within the defense establishment. The Commission on
Indigent Defense Services (IDS), a statewide body created late in
2000 to establish standards and coordinate budgets for the county-
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level public defenders,35 set out to establish credibility with the key
legislators in the appropriations process. In 2002, Democratic
Governor Mike Easley asked all state agencies, including courts and
corrections, to find budget cuts in an effort to shrink a growing
deficit.36 As part of the Commission's response to this budgetary
challenge, the chief financial officer for IDS first proposed in April
2002 that the Commission ask for changes to the existing recoupment statutes to make them less "confusing."3 7 The changes, the
CFO said, might include a "co-pay" of $40, modeled on a Florida
law that "works well." 3' The executive director of IDS spoke in favor
of a co-pay proposal, pointing out that "many people" who cannot
afford $5000 to retain an attorney can afford a smaller amount.3 9
The commission chair thought it was "important for the Commission
to come forward with cost-saving ideas if possible."4' Given this
early endorsement from key leaders, the Commission authorized the
staff to develop proposals for a co-payment from indigent clients. 4 '
From there, the idea quickly gained momentum. At its next two
meetings, the Commission discussed a package of legislative
proposals that included revisions to the existing recoupment
statute, along with a new $50 application fee to be charged to all
defendants who receive publicly funded counsel.42 Executive
Director Malcolm "Tye" Hunter (the chief appellate defender for the
state before taking over as the first director of IDS), noting that the
proposal would "pass if IDS pushes for it,"4 3 made the case in terms
of overall program health: "[L]ook at this proposal in [the] context
35. Indigent Defense Services Act of 2000, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws 144.
36. Associated Press, N.C. Agencies Leave Jobs Vacant To Meet Budgets, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Apr. 10, 2002, at 3B.
37. Meeting Minutes of Comm'n on Indigent Def. Servs., in Raleigh, N.C. (Apr. 19,2002),
available at http://www.ncids.org/IDS%20Commission/2002%20Meeting%20Minutes/02April.htm.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Meeting Minutes of Comm'n on Indigent Def. Servs., in Durham, N.C. (May 10, 2002)
[hereinafter IDS Minutes, May 2002], available at http://www.ncids.org/IDS%20Commission/
2002%2OMeeting%2OMinutes/02_may.htm; Meeting Minutes of Comm'n on Indigent Def.
Servs., in Asheboro, N.C. (June 21, 2002) [hereinafter IDS Minutes, June 2002], availableat
http'/www.ncids.org/IDS%20Commission/2002%20Meeting%20Minutes/02june.htm.
43. IDS Minutes, May 2002, supra note 42.
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of the fund's bad financial shape and the Commission's earlier
decision to ask the Legislature for more money."" Hunter estimated
that the fee could generate over a million dollars a year, and argued
that it would have a limited impact on defendants because judges
would not deny counsel for nonpayment of the fee and because
"many clients can afford to pay $50. "4'
Initially, some of the commissioners were reluctant to endorse the
application fee, questioning "whether indigent defendants would be
able to come up with that sum," particularly those in "groups with
high unemployment rates."4 6 For such clients, "a $50 fee could mean
no groceries," and the commissioners feared the fee "might pressure
defendants into waiving attorneys. 4 These reservations mostly
came from commissioners who were either trial judges or practicing
defense attorneys." When these commissioners asked if the
experiences of other states could tell them anything about likely
waiver rates, staff members responded that other states did not
gather information about waivers and it would be "difficult to
quantify."4 9
Ultimately, however, all but one of the commissioners were
convinced that the application fee was worth pursuing.5" Because
the proposed statute explicitly stated that "[ilnability [or] failure ...
to pay the appointment fee shall not be grounds for denying
appointment of counsel,"5 1 the language seemed to protect destitute
44. IDS Minutes, June 2002, supra note 42. The "context" Hunter spoke of was "to
improve representation." See IDS Minutes, May 2002, supra note 42. Hunter explained "any
fees collected would be a source of income for the fund in the present fiscal year, which would
benefit the clients as a whole." IDS Minutes, May 2002, supra note 42.
45. IDS Minutes, May 2002, supra note 42.
46. Id.
47. IDS Minutes, June 2002, supra note 42.
48. The minutes reflect objections from Boshamer (public defender), Hufstader (public
defender), Morgan (superior court judge), Tally (capital defense attorney), and Hurley (capital
defense attorney). See IDS Minutes, May 2002, supra note 42; IDS Minutes, June 2002, supra
note 42. Some commissioners were also concerned that the fee would apply to defendants who
are acquitted or whose cases are dismissed. See id. Executive Director Hunter responded by
noting "acquitted defendants do not get refunds from retained attorneys" and "$50 is a good
investment even for a person who is acquitted." IDS Minutes, May 2002, supra note 42.
49. IDS Minutes, June 2002, supra note 42.
50. Id. Only Henry Boshamer, the commissioner appointed by the county-level public
defenders, voted against the fee proposal. Id.
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-455.1(d) (2003).
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defendants. Indeed, the commissioners, led by the representative of
the state bar association, turned aside an amendment that would
have instructed judges to inform defendants that nonpayment of the
fee would not prevent them from receiving an attorney, because "no
defendants [would] pay the fee if the judge [told] them they [did]
not have to pay it," meaning that the fee "[would] not raise any
revenue. " 52 They left unchanged the current practice, which allows
judges to tell defendants that an appointed attorney is not free,
because the defendant might have to pay for the services later after
a recoupment hearing.5 3 The commissioners decided to "see how it
works" and to consider rules later if necessary to reduce the number
of waivers,5 4 yet they created no method for studying the impact of
the new fee on the choices of prospective clients.
Once the IDS Commission settled on its proposal, the North
Carolina legislature passed the application fee statute without
fanfare, burying it in a larger budget bill. 5 Observers identified the
IDS Commission as the source of the bill.56
Soon after its passage, however, the public began to hear from the
lower levels of the defense establishment. The chief public defenders
and private defense attorneys in various counties criticized the new
law, 57 and attorneys in many counties filed constitutional challenges
at their first opportunity. Many critics emphasized that the fee
would deter defendants from requesting appointed counsel to which
52. IDS Minutes, June 2002, supra note 42. Commissioner Joe Cheshire, who was
appointed to the Commission by the North Carolina Bar Association, also opined that "most
criminal defendants have done something wrong," so he was "not concerned about requiring
them to pay some small amount of money for a good attorney." Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Current Operations, Capitol Improvements, and Finance Act of 2002, 2002 N.C.
Sess. Laws 126.
56. See Paul Garber, Court To Decide If Fee for Indigents Is Legal, WINSTON-SALEM J.
(N.C.), Apr. 3, 2003, at B1 (stating that IDS "pushed for the fees last year to help make up for
budget shortfalls").
57. See Mike Fuchs, PublicDefender ChallengesFee:A Guilford County Judge Will Decide
Whether a New Fee Poor Defendants Pay Is Unconstitutional,GREENSBORO NEWS & REc.
(N.C.), Mar. 12, 2003, at B13 (quoting Guilford County Public Defender Wally Harrelson as
stating that the fee statute "establishes a very dangerous precedent of imposing fines or costs
or fees upon indigent defendants when the state runs short of money"); John Stevenson,
Durham Senior Judge Rules $50 Application Fee Unconstitutional,HERALD-SUN (Durham,
N.C.), Mar. 4, 2003, at C1.
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they were constitutionally entitled.5 8 As Forsyth County Public
Defender Pete Clary put it, "What defendants are being told and
what they're hearing when they get arrested is they can't get a
court-appointed attorney unless they have $50.""9 These frontline
actors also dismissed the programmatic concerns of the IDS
Commission ("I'm not in the money-raising business, I'm in the
business of helping clients") and found it "ironic that the people who
were set up to protect the rights of indigents are the very people
60
who asked for this [law] to be imposed."
In the end, this criticism from the ranks did not derail the law. A
few months after passage of the original application fee statute, the
IDS Commission debated whether it should ask for a repeal of the
application fee, for "public relations" reasons.6 ' The Commission
decided, however, that it had already "weathered the storm" and
would not seek repeal of the fee. 2 Indeed, Executive Director
Hunter declared that he did not understand the fuss over the fee
among public defenders because the appointment of counsel was not
strictly conditioned on payment of the required fee."
B. Debate Themes
The political debate over application fees in North Carolina
featured several themes that also appeared during similar debates
elsewhere in the country. First, the organizational priorities of the
debaters were predictable, and what the debaters said depended
largely on where they stood in the organizational structure. Second,
fee proposals appeared during times of special budgetary stress for
indigent criminal defense programs. For example, in Minnesota, the
58. See Fuchs,supra note 57 (quoting Public Defender Wally Harrelson as suggesting that
the fee could have a "chilling effect" by discouraging some defendants from getting courtappointed lawyers).
59. See Paul Garber, Court Fee Is Under Fire, WINSTON-SALEM J. (N.C.), Mar. 13, 2003,
at B1.
60. Id. (quoting public defenders Pete Clary and Wally Harrelson).
61. See Meeting Minutes of Comm'n on Indigent Def. Servs., in Raleigh, N.C. (May 8,
2003) [hereinafter IDS Minutes, May 20031, available at http'J/www.ncids.org/IDS%20
Commission/2003%2OMeeting%20%2OMinutes/05_03.htm.
62. Id.
63. Editorial, CourtFees, WINSTON-SALEM J. (N.C.), Mar. 16, 2003, at A18; Garber, supra
note 59.
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legislature enacted an application fee law during a round of budget
cuts designed to cut appropriations for the public defender service
by 1 5 %. 4 A similar scenario played out in numerous other states.6 5
In this context of weak and variable funding, the priorities for the
leadership of defense groups followed naturally: as political actors,
they saw application fees in terms of their short- and long-term
budgetary effects. In some states, as in Ohio, the leaders of the
defense organizations themselves advanced the application fee
proposal, burnishing their reputation for fiscal responsibility.6 6
While the leaders were typically not enthused about the application
fees, they needed to respond to demands from governors and
legislatures to cut the costs of their programs. They endorsed
application fees as the best available option in difficult financial
times. As John Stuart, the state public defender in Minnesota,
stated, "It would be much better if the work of the court system
could be paid by general revenues. But this year that money was
not there, so this system was put in place to keep from cutting
the [budget ofil public defenders by $10 million."6 7 Similarly, in
64. Margaret Zack & Pam Louwagie, Public-Defender Fees Thrown Out, STAR-TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Sept. 4, 2003, at 1B; see also Brief of Amici Legislators at 4-5, State v.
Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403 (Minn. 2003) (No. A03-1281); James L. Baillie, Our Public Defender
System: A Funding Crisis,BENCH & B. MINN., Feb. 2004, at 5, 5.
65. See, e.g., Laura A. Bischoff, Taft Budget PlanRaises Fees, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Ohio),
Feb. 13, 2005, at BI (discussing application fee legislation as part of a package of user fees in
Ohio intended to generate $56 million in total fees for the state); Rachel Tobin Ramos,
Fletcher Rallies Judges Against Bill To Fund PDs, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP. (Ga.), Mar.
19, 2004 (reporting that the Georgia lawmakers used a court administration bill as a vehicle
for enacting application fees for appointed counsel "because of the difficulty of funding a new
program in lean budget years"); cf Editorial, Not Too Much of a Burden, GREENVILLE NEWS
(S.C.), Sept. 18, 2003, at 10A (noting that Greenville County responded to the "unfunded
mandate" of the Supreme Court's decision in Alabama v. Shelton by imposing an application
fee).
66. In Ohio, the statewide public defender's office proposed an application fee in response
to the governor's call for agencies to find new sources of funding. See Mark Niquette, Critics
Blast Proposed Lawyer Fee for the Poor, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Feb. 15, 2005, at BI
(quoting a spokesperson for the Ohio Public Defender's Office as saying that the proposed
application fee is "something in good budget times we would not have supported"); see also
IDS Minutes, May 2003, supra note 61 ("[Tlhe [application] fee has been an important part
of showing the Legislature that we are trying to raise money and be fiscally responsible.").
67. Margaret Zack, Hennepin County Public Defenders Contest New Law, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), July 3, 2003, at 1B; see also Bill Rankin, Legislature 2004: Indigent
Defense FundingProposed,ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 11, 2004, at D5 (quoting the director of
the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council as favoring a funding package based partly
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Colorado, the Office of the State Public Defender backed a fee as a
means to reduce its misdemeanor caseload and thereby provide
additional resources for its felony-level representations. 8
Just as the budgetary perspective drove the choices of defense
establishment leaders, the needs of individual clients dominated the
views of application fee critics, who predictably came from the lower
tiers of the defense organizational infrastructure.6 9 To critics,
budgetary and broader political considerations were someone else's
concern; a matter of deep constitutional principle was at stake, and
public defenders should never take the first step to compromise this
principle. As noted by one public defender, there is "something
outrageous about charging poor people for the exercise of their Sixth
Amendment right. We wouldn't charge fees for welfare benefits.""
Similarly, critics of application fees highlighted the likely waiver
consequences of fees, positing that a fee, even a small one, would
chill the likelihood that poor defendants would request counsel.'
on a $50 application fee: "As a result of all the effort that went into this issue, we feel they've
come up with a reasonable solution of how to fund the statewide system.").
68. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 34, at 5-6.
69. See Steve Karnowski, Public DefendersNow Coming with a Cost, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Nov. 14, 2003, available at httpJ/www.lexisone.com/news/apaplll403a.html ("While many
public defenders [in Minnesota] condemn the new fees, the state's chief public defender
supports them.").
70. Lynn 0. Rosenstock, Indigent Defense: The Price of Being Indigent and Accused,
CHAMPION, Aug. 2004, at 50, 50 (quoting Kathryn Kase, staff attorney for the Texas Defender
Service); see also Robert E. Pierre, Right to an Attorney Comes at a Price; Minnesota Law
Requiring Fees for Public Defenders Is Challenged, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2003, at Al
(according to Professor Norman Lefstein, shifting the costs of defense to defendants "without
regard to the consequences [is] inconsistent with the fundamental right to counsel"); Bill
Rankin, Indigent Defense Is Back on Rails, ATLANTA J. -CONST., May 2, 2004, at D1 ("This is
a fundamental constitutional obligation that the state has. The cost of paying for it should be
shared by everyone." (quoting Georgia defense attorney Stephen Bright's criticism of
application fees)); cf Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 378 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that state-funded defense counsel is an "unavoidable consequence] of a system of
government which is required to proceed against its citizens in a public trial").
71. See Pierre, supra note 70 ("The danger is that people will not avail themselves of the
right to counsel to avoid the charge." (quoting Norman Lefstein, Dean Emeritus, Indiana
University School of Law)); Zack, supra note 67 (quoting Jim Kamin, a public defender in
Minnesota, as opposing an application fee because "individuals who can't afford it may not
seek a public defender and try to represent themselves"); see also Peter Erlinder, Muting
Gideon's Trumpet: Pricing the "Right to Counsel" in Minnesota Courts, BENCH & B. MINN.,
Dec. 2003, at 16 (asserting that application fees "may do more to solve the courts' and public
defenders' funding problems by coercing 'waivers' of Gideon and Mirandathan by generating
'income' from desperate indigents who pay the fees").
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Critics failed to present any hard data on the waiver question, but
invoked vivid reminders about the reality of poverty, along with
anecdotes suggesting that a small fee could have effects on the
waiver decisions of a large group of defendants.7 2 As one public
defender in Minnesota described the effects, a fee ranging between
$50 and $200 (depending on the charged offense) "is literally taking
the food out of the mouths of [defendants'] children."73 Finally,
critics took pains to point out that while the application fees taken
alone are fairly small, they assume "greater magnitude" when
combined with the litany of other fees that defendants must pay,
such as probation services fees and victim assistance fund fees.74
After field-level critics shifted the focus of the debate away from
the system's financial viability and onto client effects, fee supporters
typically offered several replies that related to individual clients.
They stressed that fees were not very large when compared to other
expenses involved in every criminal defense 75 and noted that judges
could waive fees for truly destitute individuals.7 6 Or, if there was no
72. See Amy Mayron, Law on Legal Aid Fee Voided, PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul, Minn.),
Sept. 3, 2003, at 1B ("They're trying to balance the budget on the back of our clients .... You're
hitting the people who absolutely have the least ability to absorb that hit. I think it's atrocious
.... The last thing they need is something [negative] on their credit rating." (quoting Geoffrey
Isaacman, Hennepin County assistant public defender)); Steven H. Pollak, $50 for a Free
Lawyer? It's Been Hard To Collect, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP. (Ga.), June 30, 2005, at 1
(reporting that a Georgia public defender stated that "in Fulton [County,] many clients don't
have the money for the fee-especially those who are already in jail").
73. Zack & Louwagie, supra note 64; see also Brett Barrouquere, Senators Back Fee for
Anyone Seeking PublicDefender,ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), May 6, 2003, at 6A (reporting
that a state senator opposed Louisiana's application fee bill partly because $40 can make it
possible for some people to eat meals they otherwise would not eat); Pam Louwagie &
Margaret Zack, Court Rejects Fees for Defense; Poor Defendants Don't Have To Pay for
Lawyers, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Feb. 13,2004, at 1A [hereinafter Louwagie & Zack,
Court Rejects Fees] (stating that although the state public defender office supported
application fees, "some other public defenders argued that the law might have meant the
difference between defense and dinners for some clients").
74. See Rosenstock, supra note 70, at 51.
75. See Barrouquere, supra note 73 ("Many people can afford the fee, but not the cost of
an attorney for the duration of their criminal cases." (paraphrasing a Louisiana state
senator)); Louwagie & Zack, Court Rejects Fees, supra note 73 (quoting Minnesota State
Representative Steve Strachan as exclaiming that the $200 maximum application fee is "not
even an hour's worth of time for most attorneys"); Pierre, supra note 70 ("These are modest
amounts .... We're trying to get some balance here. Too many judges [under the prior law
permitting waiver] just waived the fee as a general rule." (quoting Minnesota State
Representative Eric Lipman)).
76. See Niquette, supra note 66 (reporting that a spokesperson for the Ohio Public
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explicit judicial waiver authority, the statute provided that payment
of the fee was not a precondition to obtaining an attorney. 7 Others
downplayed the practical significance of fees by pointing to the
inevitable obstacles that would prevent the state from fully
collecting the monies.7 8 As the director of the Louisiana Indigent
Defense Assistance Board pointed out, the collection of application
fees often falls to local public defender offices, and the "law does not
spell out repercussions" for offices that fail to collect the fee.79
Finally, supporters of fees even speculated that the small investment by a client could improve the attorney-client relationship,
because the payment would give the client a stake in the representation and an enhanced expectation that the public defender is a
"real" lawyer.8 °
Supporters of fees, like their critical counterparts, however,
offered no empirical support and no relevant program data to
support these hypotheses about expected client behavior. Rather,
drawing upon economic reasoning about the likely incentives that
clients face, they assumed rational action by clients in the face of
predictable options.
The rejoinder of critics to this series of claims about clients
amounted to a weary sigh-the response of veterans to the idealistic
claims of theorists who lack practical wisdom. Although the statutes
did state the principle that payment of the application fee was not
Defender's Office noted that "judges would have the ability to waive the [proposed application
fee] if they determine someone can't afford to pay it").
77. See Zack, supra note 67 (reporting Minnesota State Public Defender John Stuart's
belief that "nobody will be denied an attorney" for nonpayment of the fee; in the event of
nonpayment, the state will provide a defense and collect the fee another way, such as from
a tax refund).
78. See Karnowski, supra note 69 (stating that the "main tool" for collecting unpaid fees
through tax refunds and lottery winnings is "fairly weak"); Mayron, supra note 72 (reporting
that fee supporters argued that the collection of unpaid fees is handled by civil action and
"collection is a low priority for state revenue workers"); Pollak, supra note 72 (quoting the
chair of the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council as saying that it is "very unlikely"
that Georgia would attempt to collect unpaid application fees because "the collection efforts
would exceed the $50").
79. Meghan Gordon, Fee HasProvided $44,000 to PublicDefender,TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), July 20, 2004, at BI (noting a comment by the director of the Louisiana Indigent
Defense Assistance Board that not every district has opted to collect the application fee).
80. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 34, at 4; see also Pollak, supra note 72 ("I think
even poor people should be given the dignity of making contributions for their defense, if they
can." (quoting B. Michael Mears, director of the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council)).
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a precondition for receiving an attorney, critics asserted that this
subtlety was lost on most poor clients. Indigent clients do not
calculate the practical odds that the state will invoke its civil
enforcement options; they only hear the message that a lawyer is
not free."' Even though defendants are told that they can avoid the
fee if they plead guilty, they are not always informed that they can
nevertheless still receive counsel even if they plead not guilty and
cannot pay. 2 This failure to inform indigents that they will still get
counsel even if they cannot pay a fee leads to a "system of perfunctory waiver [."i3
This fissure within the defense community, repeated in state after
state, takes place without much practically relevant advice from
professional organizations. The recommendations from professional
groups either remain largely agnostic or assume that application
fees are permissible only as an alternative to recoupment. The
CriminalJustice Standardsof the American Bar Association (ABA)
stake out a position against recoupment: it "should not be required,
except on the ground of fraud in obtaining the determination of
eligibility. " ' 4 The ABA policy with respect to application fees or
"contribution," on the other hand, is more positive. According to the
ABA Standards, although the imposition of a fee potentially
conflicts with the Sixth Amendment, 5 an appropriately limited fee,
imposed after proper notice, might be acceptable. 6 This tempered

81. The North Carolina defense establishment explicitly rejected an effort to instruct
judges to clear up this potential misunderstanding among defendants. See supra text
accompanying notes 51-53.
82. Rosenstock, supra note 70, at 51.
83. Id. (quoting Jim Neuhard, director of the Michigan State Appellate Defender Office,
an active participant in the national debate); see also Garber, supranote 59 ("The unfortunate
effect of this is that some people are scared to ask for a court-appointed lawyer because they're
under the impression that they have to have this money up front." (quoting Pete Clary,
Forsyth County Public Defender)).
84. AM. BAR ASSN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS CoMm., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-7.2(a) (3d ed. 1992). In support, the ABA
notes "compelling policy reasons," including the chilling effect on a defendant's exercise of the
right to counsel and the interference with the defendant's rehabilitation that a long-term
financial obligation might impose. See id. cmt. at 93.
85. See id. cmt. at 91 (noting "the apparent conflict in these standards between the
obligation of advice of the right to appointed counsel at state expense and the potential
obligation of the defendant to contribute").
86. See id. Standard 5-7.2(b)-(c).
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view is justified, the ABA reasons, because contribution is an
improvement over traditional recoupment practices. Contribution
amounts to far less than repaying the total cost of representation,
and does not impose "long-term financial debts" on the defendant.8 7
Presuming that application fees are normally not charged "unless
there is a realistic prospect that the defendants can make reasonably prompt payments," 8 contribution is less likely than recoupment "to chill the exercise by defendants of their right to counsel."8 9
Similarly, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association's
(NLADA) Guidelinesfor Legal Defense Systems supports imposing
a "limited cash contribution," so long as some assurance exists that
the fee will not impose a financial hardship on the defendant.9 °
On their face, these recommendations give conditional approval
to application fees. Yet, given the political reality of the application
87. See id. cmt. at 93.
88. Id. Potential clients "required to contribute to the costs of counsel should be informed,
prior to an offer of counsel, of the obligation to make a contribution. Contribution should not
be imposed unless satisfactory procedural safeguards are provided." Id. Standard 5-7.2(b)-(c).
89. Id. cmt. at 93.
In August 2004, the ABA House of Delegates adopted guidelines in an effort to elaborate
on the "procedural safeguards" urged but not specified in the 1992 Standards. See STANDING
COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASSN, RECOMMENDATION No. 110:
ABA GUIDELINES ON CONTRIBUTION FEES FOR COSTS OF COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (Aug.
9, 2004) [hereinafter ABA, CONTRIBUTION FEES RECOMMENDATION], available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/ indigentdefense/recllO.pdf. The ABA
noted that the guidelines were not intended to "modify" Standard 5-7.2, but emphasized that
additional guidance is "urgently needed at this time." Id. at 6. The ABA also evinced
considerably greater concern about fees in principle, cautioning that
[t]he use of application fees carries an unacceptable risk of chilling the exercise
of the right to counsel. To a defendant of limited means, a fixed fee as high as
$200 may represent a substantial financial burden. Because the fee is usually
assessed before any representation is provided, indigent defendants may choose
to waive their right to counsel as soon as they learn of the fee to avoid the
obligation of payment.
Id. at 4.
90. NATL STUDY COMM. ON DEF. SERVS., SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS: GUIDELINES
FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES Guideline 1.7 (1976), available at
http:/Avww.nlada.org/Defender/Defender Standards/GuidelinesForLegaDefenseSystems.
The guidelines also advise that the public defender office itself should assess the fee. Id.
Guideline 1.7(a). The defender "should determine the amount to be contributed," which
'should be made in a single lump sum payment immediately upon, or shortly after, the
eligibility determination." Id. The fee should not exceed (1) 10% of the total maximum that
would be payable for the representation under the assigned counsel fee schedule or (2) a "sum
equal to the fee generally paid to an assigned counsel for one trial day in a comparable case."
Id. Guideline 1.7(b).
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fees enacted around the country-the fees typically supplement the
income from traditional recoupment, rather than create an alternative to recoupment 9 1 -neither the ABA Standards nor the NLADA
Guidelines endorse the current crop of application fees. Nor, given
the political atmosphere, does it appear likely that legislatures will
accept the procedural protections and substantive limits that the
professional organizations list as preconditions. 92
Standards of professional ethics also offer little concrete guidance
for public defenders who must operate with application fees after
the passage of the laws. Because the application fee statutes can
require that public defenders themselves collect the fees, the fees
raise ethical concerns. Defenders face the temptation of using the
fee to control a burdensome caseload 93 by stressing the costs of
representation to defendants already sitting on the fence, especially
among misdemeanor defendants known for making hasty and
improvident waivers.9 4 Public defenders can also create distrust
among their clients by raising the issue of fees and collections at the
start of the attorney-client relationship.9 5 Moreover, in an insidious
sense, with fees in place and legislative appropriations built around
the projected revenues from those fees, defense counsel have an
incentive not to advocate for reduced fees or waivers because any
victory for a client will reduce the public defense budget.9"

91. Wisconsin represents an exception to this trend. See John B. Arango, Defense Services
for the Poor: Nebraska Reforms Indigent Defense System, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1995, at 38, 39
(noting that the Wisconsin legislature adopted an application fee instead of the governor's
proposal to collect $11 million from recoupments following conviction).
92. See, e.g., ABA, CONTRIBUTION FEES RECOMMENDATION, supranote 89, at 7-10 (urging,
inter alia, that defendants be permitted to be heard and to present information, including
witnesses, on whether a fee can be afforded, backed by a right ofjudicial review of the initial
determination).
93. See Scott J. Silverman, Imposing and Recouping Attorneys' Fees from Publicly
Represented CriminalDefendants, FLA. B.J., May 1996, at 18.
94. See BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 16, at 39; Robert C. Boruchowitz, The Right to
Counsel: Every Accused Person's Right, WASH. STATE B. NEWS, Jan. 2004, at 22, 24-25,
availableat httpA/www.wsba.org/media/publications/barnews/2004/jan-04-borouchowitz.htm.
95. See Pollak, supra note 72 (quoting noted Georgia defense attorney Stephen Bright as
saying that a fee "puts the public defenders themselves in a difficult position to start out the
relationship with a client by trying to collect a fee").
96. See Rosenstock, supra note 70, at 51 (noting the view expressed by Michigan public
defender Jim Neuhard).
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While the factions of the defense establishment argue among
themselves about the desirability of application fees, prosecutors
and their professional organizations remain quietly on the sidelines
of the dispute. They typically support the idea of fees because the
projected fee amounts take some pressure off the general tax
revenues devoted 'to law enforcement and courts,9" as a result
possibly lessening annual public defense appropriations and
strengthening their own budgetary negotiating positions. When
prompted by legislators or journalists, prosecutors publicly express
their support for the fees.9 8 They also publicly fret that if defense
lawyers are not available, because of budgetary shortfalls, they
must extend unduly lenient plea deals to defendants, based on the
need to avoid jail time (and thus the trigger of the constitutional
right to counsel). 9 At the same time, it is possible that prosecutors
favor fees because more defendants would waive counsel and plead
guilty without difficult plea negotiations.
As for the attitude of judges toward the application fees, they
divide in much the same way as the different levels of the defense
establishment. While some judges express support for the fees,
based on the idea that any new revenue source for the court system
is welcome, judges at the trial level, especially in misdemeanor
court, express more concern about the effect of the fees on indigent
defendants. ' °0 Like the field-level defense attorneys, trial-level
97. See, e.g., Garber, supra note 56 (noting that North Carolina Attorney General Roy
Cooper and "many other state officials and district attorneys" support application fees because
they are "necessary to help pay for the cash-strapped court system"); Paul Garber, N.C.
JusticesAre Asked To Rule on Indigent Court Fee in 4 Cases, WINSTON-SALEM J. (N.C.), Mar.
25, 2003, at B1 [hereinafter Garber, N.C. Justices Asked To Rule] (quoting Forsyth County
district attorney, who supported the application fee, as saying that "[t] his could be close to $1
million (a year) that would not have to come out of the taxpayers' pockets"). But see Editorial,
Chargingthe Indigent Only CourtsInsensitivity, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC. (N.C.), Mar. 10,
2003, at A6 (noting that prosecutors in one North Carolina county declined to appeal a
constitutional ruling against the fee statute and "confessed the fee made them
uncomfortable").
98. Garber, supra note 56; Garber, N.C. Justices Asked To Rule, supra note 97; see also
Barbara L. Jones, High Court Hears Testimony on Defenders'Relief Request, MINN. LAWYER,
Oct. 20, 2003 (describing prosecutors' efforts to lobby the legislature for public defender
funding and to advocate "greater efficiencies" in providing defense counsel services, such as
"more carefully scrutinizing applications for public defender representation").
99. See, e.g., John Gibeaut, The Good Fight Gets Harder,ABA J., Feb. 2004, 41, 45.
100. See infra Part III.
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judges speak with concern about defendants who might waive their
access to an attorney because of a fee.' 0 '
C. PoliticalTheory and InternalDefense-Side Politics
According to most theoretical accounts of the legislative process,
when it comes to matters of criminal justice, a simple model offers
the most predictive power: prosecutors and law enforcement always
get what they want from the legislature.0 2 For instance, when the
legislature considers whether to expand the reach of substantive
criminal law, prosecutors lobby in favor of a new weapon in their
arsenal. Legislators tend to ally themselves with the prosecutors
because that is their surest path to re-election.0 3 Voters and
political donors generally picture themselves as potential victims
of crime, and approve of expanded powers and budgets for those
who fight crime. As for those who might picture themselves as
criminal suspects or defendants, they overwhelmingly come from
marginalized social groups lacking money for campaign contributions and meaningful political influence on election outcomes.' 4 As
Robert Kennedy famously put it: "The poor man charged with crime
has no lobby." °5
According to this model of crime politics, the key variable to
understand is what the prosecutor and law enforcement agencies
want. With that fact in hand, one can pretty confidently predict
what the legislature will do.

101. See infra Part III.
102. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 529-31 (2001).
103. See id. at 529-30.
104. See Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminaland Civil Retroactive
Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2168-69 (1996) ("Legislators need not fear that enacting most
criminal measures will dry up campaign coffers. Throughout history, criminal offenders have
been from the poorest strata of society.... Nor will legislators necessarily lose votes if they are
insensitive to the needs of convicted felons. Felons often cannot vote ..... ); see also Donald A.
Dripps, Criminal Procedure,FootnoteFour, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don't
Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993)
(employing public choice theory to analyze the criminal law field and concluding that
legislatures undervalue the rights of the accused).
105. ANTHONy LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 211 (1964) (quoting then U.S. attorney general
Robert F. Kennedy).
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The prosecutor-centered theory of crime legislation, however, does
not explain all criminal justice debates equally well. Some more
complex settings exist when a pro-prosecution, anti-defendant
outcome in crime politics is not assured. For instance, when state
legislatures consider how to set criminal penalties, the high costs
of prison beds sometimes lead them to deny prosecutors the
longer-authorized sentences that they seek.'0 ° Alternatively, when
legislatures structure the criminal court system, they sometimes
respond to the wishes of judges and the organized bar, who are
groups that might contradict the requests of prosecutors and
incidentally benefit criminal defendants."'
The legislative debates about application fees present another
environment that does not fit well within a prosecutor-centered
theory of crime legislation. These debates do not pit prosecutorial
advocates against defense advocates, leading legislators to side with
the prosecutors. Instead, as discussed above, the key to understanding these legislative debates is to follow the debate among the
attorneys on the defense side. When the leaders of the defense
establishment initiate or endorse an application fee statute,
legislators become even more predisposed to vote for the proposed
legislation, which they can already fairly characterize as "tough on
crime."0
Similar political coalitions are likely to produce or affect other
monetary obligations targeting indigent defendants, such as
recoupment of fees and definitions of indigency. These coalitions
have made possible the recent broader private subsidization
movement, aptly referred to as "pay-as-you-go" criminal justice.'0 9

106. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 806-07 (2005).
107. See Wright, supra note 6, at 265-67 (describing legislatures requiring various forms
of resource parity between public defenders and prosecutors).
108. See, e.g., Barrouquere, supra note 73 (describing a Louisiana state senator's
endorsement of an application fee bill because both prosecutors and defense attorneys
supported it).
109. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Many Local Officials Now Make Inmates Pay Their Own
Way, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at Al (noting proliferating state and local efforts to require
inmates to pay for their room and board); cf. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979 n.9
(1991) (Scalia, J.) (noting that government has no incentive to restrain amounts of criminal
fines because "fines are a source of revenue").

2070

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:2045

Collecting such fees from defendants remains politically popular
despite the disappointing monetary results that typically accrue."'
This setting emphasizes the common ground between the leaders
of prosecution and defense organizations, who view issues from a
similar systemic perspective."' The leaders of both types of
organizations are, at bottom, political animals who establish longterm relationships with key legislators, and are willing to trade
short-term losses for long-term gains. Despite the naturally
occurring conflicts between defense and prosecution leadership
groups," 2 they share a core common interest in the viability of the
criminal courts."' They also share common problems in managing
their employees, the rank-and-file attorneys who staff their
respective offices."'
110. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 34, at 29 (reporting a 6% to 20% rate for
application fee collection); Amy Sherman, Defendants Squeezed for Drug Tests, Probation
Costs Fees Are Part of Trend To Help Pay for Criminal Defense, PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul,
Minn.), Dec. 27, 2003, at B1 (noting that Minnesota secured only $93,000 during the first
three months of its nonwaivable application fee, a pace far short of the hoped-for $5 million
per year); cf. Amy Sherman, Inmates' JailFee Yields Little Green: 'Pay-to-Stay'ProgramWas
To Offset Counties'Costs, PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul, Minn.), Sept. 14, 2003, at C1 (noting that
Minnesota counties collected from inmates far less than the projected cost of the inmates'
room and board).
111. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Effective Assistance: Reconceiving the Role of the Chief
PublicDefender, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETH. 199, 199-200 (1999) ("In the last two decades, chief
defenders have been locked into a narrow managerial role .... Wedged between competing
obligations to clients and funding authorities, chief defenders have narrowly defined their
function as controlling the office's operations to stay within budget guidelines.").
112. Evidence of this conflict manifested itself in California, where over the course of its
seven-year existence the state public defender office doubled the appellate reversal rate, only
to have its budget cut in half and eventually disappear. See Charles M. Sevilla, Gideon and
the Short Happy Life of California'sPublicDefender Office, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 44,
44.
113. See BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 16, at 13 (quoting the statement of former U.S.
Attorney General Janet Reno to this effect); see also,e.g., Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 744
(9th Cir. 2003) (declaring moot an action jointly filed by public defenders and the county
district attorney's office challenging indigent defense cutbacks, which would curtail counsel
appointments for four months and create major backlogs in the prosecutor's office). As Kim
Taylor-Thompson points out, in the early years of public defense, during the first decades of
the 1900s, defender offices were "team players" dedicated to reducing "conflicts with the
prosecution" and increasing system efficiency, not providing zealous assistance to their
clients. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. InstitutionalPlayer:Alternating Visions
of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2423-25 (1996).
114. See Chester L. Mirsky, The PoliticalEconomy and Indigent Defense: New York City,
1917-1998, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 891, 915-17 (noting parallel employer-related challenges
in respective offices).
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In regard to application fees and other devices that shift costs to
criminal defendants, however, it is apparent that the political
economy of defense and prosecution leadership diverge. While
prosecutors have no divided loyalties, the defense leadership must
balance the need for stable funding and system viability with the
real-life experience of poverty-stricken clients. The danger is that
the defense leadership, either because they lack ground-level
experience in criminal defense or because they have developed
habits of agreement with prosecutors on questions such as system
funding, will not place enough weight on the impact on clients.
These habits of agreement get reinforced by the sources of information (such as systemwide cost data and court processing statistics)
and the circle of contacts (leadership groups in the judiciary, the
prosecutorial organizations, and legislative committees) that become
routine for the defense establishment.
Under such circumstances, the defense leadership can become
preternaturally inclined to take political positions that do not align
with the interests of clients. When defense leaders barter in the
name of achieving budgetary relief,"5 they can fail to consider the
impact of application fees on those potential clients who decide not
to request a lawyer, because they never enter the system, never get
counted in the statistics, and ultimately never become a visible
reality to the lawyers working in the office."'
A thought experiment might suggest the optimal position for the
defense leadership to take in legislative debates about application
fees. If the design of the system were put to a majority vote of all
criminal defendants, both those who ultimately request lawyers
and those who do not, would the defendants as a group vote to
accept application fees? Would they choose a more well-funded
system available only to those willing or able to pay versus a less
well-funded system that is more accessible to the entire group?" 7
115. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 111, at 203 ("To the virtual exclusion of all other
tasks, [chief defenders] have devoted their energies and creative talents to securing adequate
budgets for their offices.").
116. Cf BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 16, at 26 (noting that in 2002, in Riverside County,
California, over 12,700 persons plead guilty without ever speaking with counsel, resulting
from a law removing public defenders from municipal court arraignments).
117. One scholar has proposed allocating indigent defense funding based on default rules.
See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from
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The answer to these questions could educate the defense leadership
on whether to trade an advantage for some defendants in exchange
for a disadvantage for others. Unfortunately, defense leaders have
no reliable way to answer this question, because they do not
routinely talk to clients, and even if they do, they have no information about those defendants who waive counsel and never become
their clients.
III. JuDIcIAL RESPONSES

Thus far, we have canvassed the political dynamic driving the
enactment of application fee laws within states. This account,
however, leaves out a key institution: the judiciary. Judges, along
with prosecutors and defense lawyers, on a daily basis operate the
buttons and levers of the criminal justice machinery in U.S.
courthouses. Yet, judges also are asked to redesign those buttons
and levers from time to time, both when implementing new laws
and when addressing challenges to their constitutionality. With
application fees for defendants who request a state-paid defense
attorney, judges have made important choices both as operators and
as re-designers of the criminal justice apparatus.
Insulated (in theory, at least) from the broader fiscal and public
relations ramifications of the laws, judges have erected practical
obstacles to the collection of application fees in the everyday
routines of the courtroom. Trial judges have the capacity to grant
waivers based on a minimal showing or even to issue blanket orders
waiving the fee for entire categories of defendants.' 1 8 When the fee
statute empowers the court clerk to collect the fee, the judges who
supervise the work of the judicial bureaucracy might do little or
nothing to promote vigorous collection. If the statute entrusts the
public defender offices with announcing and collecting the fee,
judges might signal that they will tolerate unenthusiastic collections
by the public defenders." 9

InstitutionalDesign, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801 (2004).

118. See, e.g., Pollak, supra note 72 (noting that a state court judge in Houston County,
Georgia, issued an order waiving the application fee in all criminal cases).
119. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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Judges have also shaped the impact of application fee statutes
through their rulings on legal challenges to the laws. In Minnesota
and North Carolina, the only two states in which appellate courts
have passed judgment on application fee provisions,1 2 ° first trial
judges and then appellate judges played an active role in the fate of
application fee statutes.
In North Carolina, trial courts in Durham, Forsyth, Orange, and
Guilford counties enjoined implementation of the state's $50
"appointment fee," concluding that its imposition on convicted and
acquitted defendants alike violated state and federal constitutional
law. 2 ' In response, the state attorney general asked the North
Carolina Supreme Court to enter a statewide ruling to clarify the
applicability of the fee in the state's remaining ninety-six
counties. 2 2 In a highly unusual move, the supreme court agreed to
allow the State an appeal from a trial court ruling and ordered that
court personnel should continue to apply the fee in all counties
pending a final ruling from the court itself.123
In February 2004, in a unanimous decision, the court invalidated
the fee in State v. Webb. 24 Basing its decision on North Carolina
law, the Webb court agreed with the lower court's conclusions that
the fee violated a provision of the state constitution imposing
120. This paucity of challenges, it bears mention, is striking given the number of fee
provisions in existence, and the enormous amount of litigation in recent years generated by
other criminal-justice-related fees. See, e.g., State v. Beltran, 825 P.2d 27, 29 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1992) (invalidating on ex post facto grounds a conviction "surcharge"). In an unpublished
order, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in 1992 that a "counsel fee," then in
the amount of $40 and since raised to $150, was constitutionally permissible because it did
not condition the availability of counsel on a defendant's ability to pay the fee. See Cameron
v. Justice of the Taunton Dist. Court, No. 92-203, slip op. (Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk
County, June 5, 1992); cf. Hanson v. Passer, 13 F.3d 275, 280 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a
"court cannot ... withhold the constitutionally-mandated appointment until a sum of money
is paid").
121. State v. Draper, No. 02 CR 104461 (Guilford County Dist. Ct. 2003); State v. Kelly, No.
02 CR 952 (Orange County Super. Ct. 2003); State v. McNeil, No. 02 CR 19580 (Durham
County Dist. Ct. 2003); State v. Rubio, No. 03 CR 51971 (Forsyth County Dist. Ct. 2003); State
v. Webb, No. 00 CRS 60884 (Durham County Super. Ct. 2003); see also Paul Garber, Lawyers
Lobby Justices for Ruling on Court Fees: $50 Indigent Fee Collected Unevenly in State,
WINSTON-SALEM J. (N.C.), Sept. 12, 2003, at B1.
122. Petition for an Extraordinary Writ and Motion Under Rule 2, State v. Kelly, No.
156PA03 (N.C. Mar. 24, 2003); see also Garber, supra note 121.
123. See Garber, supra note 56.
124. 591 S.E.2d 505 (N.C. 2004).
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financial liability only on those "convicted" of crimes and limited
such liability to "costs." 125 The State argued that the fee, which was
imposed regardless of the outcome in a defendant's case, was part
attorney's fee and part administrative cost, thus taking it outside
the ambit of the constitutional prohibition. 126 The court disagreed,
concluding that the fee constituted a cost by another name; it was
imposed to "support that part of the criminal justice system that
enables the State constitutionally to prosecute indigent defendants
who qualify for court-appointed counsel."127 The fee was designed to
reimburse the state for "expenses associated with keeping its
system that provides for court-appointed counsel operational," 28
and, as such, violated the state constitutional prohibition against
compelling acquitted defendants to pay "costs." 29
On the other hand, the court concluded that the law could be
imposed on convicted defendants, as to whom the constitutional
prohibition regarding payment of costs did not apply.3 ° Moreover,
the court concluded that the law, when applied only to convicted
defendants, did not have an unconstitutional chilling effect on a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the fee
served the valid purpose of defraying prosecution expenses and was
not intended to punish those who sought court-appointed counsel.''
Furthermore, according to the court, a defendant's knowledge that
he someday might be required to repay the expense of legal
services chilled the defendant's choice to rely on counsel no more

125. See id. at 509 (quoting and discussing N.C. CONST.art. I, § 23, which provides that
not [to]
"[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with [a] crime has the right ...
pay costs, jail fees, or necessary witness fees of the defense, unless found
be compelled to ...
guilty" (alteration in original) (ellipsis in original)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 509-10.
129. The court elaborated that the relevant provision, contained in article I, section 23 of
the state constitution, did "not insulate acquitted defendants from bearing the burden of
paying for their own counsel, but it does shield an acquitted defendant from having to pay for
a system designed to reimburse the state for expenses necessarily 'incurred in the conduct of
the prosecution.'" Id. at 509 (quoting State v. Wallin, 89 N.C. 578, 580 (1883)).
130. Id. at 512. The court upheld use of application fees with regard to convicted
defendants pursuant to a severability provision in the fee law. Id.
131. Id. at 513 (citing Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53 (1974)).
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than recoupment
or other constitutionally acceptable established
13 2
practices.
A similar chain of judicial events sealed the fate of Minnesota's
recently amended application fee law. The new law provoked an
immediate constitutional challenge for two reasons: first, unlike the
prior fee law, the new statute contained no waiver provision
permitting courts to exempt defendants from paying based on undue
financial hardship, and second, the new law increased the prior
application fee (referred to as a "co-payment") from $28 to a range
of $50 to $200, depending on the level of the charged offense.'3 3 The
judiciary in Hennepin County, which contains Minneapolis,
brokered an arrangement with the county public defender, who
decided to challenge the constitutionality of the law as a "strategic
litigation project," undertaken by local defenders despite the state
public defender's highly visible support for the law.'3 4 Under the
arrangement, Hennepin County-in the interest of avoiding having
the courts clogged with repeated challenges-agreed to suspend
imposition of the fee until a designated county judge could hear a
test case. 3 ' On September 2, 2003, two months after the nonwaivable application fee statute took effect, the judge invalidated it
36
on Sixth Amendment grounds and enjoined its application.
Because the court was "well aware of the financial impact [its]
ruling may have on the public defender budget," it certified the
137
matter to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
132. Id.
133. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17(c) (West Supp. 2005), with MINN. STAT. ANN. §
611.17(c) (West 2003). According to the applicable guidelines, the fee is based on "the level of
the offense at the time the public defender is appointed.Subsequent dismissals or amendments
do not impact the assessed fee." FOURTH JUDIcIAL DIST., STATE OF MINN., PUBLIC DEFENDER
ELIGIBILITY GUIDEINES-CRIMINAL Div. (effective Sept. 2,2003) (on file with authors). In State
v. Cunningham,663 N.W.2d 7 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003), the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected
arguments that the prior waivable $28 application fee violated the right to counsel and the
equal protection rights of poor and minority defendants. Id. at 9.
134. E-mail from Leonardo Castro, Hennepin County Chief Public Defender, to Wayne
Logan, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law (Aug. 4,2005) (on file with authors).
135. Id.
136. State v. Tennin, No. 03061357, at 6 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. Sept. 3, 2003)
(Findings of Fact, Order and Certification) (on file with authors). The court was at pains to
note the "administrative problems" that the county would face "if it chose to collect the copayment in thousands of cases and was then required to refund those payments." Id. at 8.
137. Id. at 7-8.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court granted accelerated review of the
matter three weeks later,'3 8 and affirmed the trial court's decision,' 39
invalidating one of the nation's two mandatory, non-waivable fee
provisions. 4 ° In a unanimous decision, the court in State v. Tennin
conceded the government's right in principle to impose a fee, but
like the trial court, faulted the lack of any judicial waiver power in
the statute.14 ' In the absence of such a waiver condition, the law
differed from the Oregon recoupment law previously upheld by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Fullerv. Oregon.'4 ' Because the law imposed
a fee without permitting an independent judicial determination of
a defendant's ability to pay, the Tennin court concluded that the law
deprived defendants of their right to counsel in violation of the
Minnesota and U.S. Constitutions. 4 3
In sum, courts at both the trial and appellate levels play an
indisputably critical part in the evolution and existence of fee laws.
In a broad institutional sense, judicial rulings that enlarge the
right to counsel create fiscal pressures that play a central role in
the origin of application fee legislative proposals.'" Later, when
figure squarely in their
the laws are implemented, courts first
45
fate.
legal
their
later,
operation, and,
Like the critics and supporters of application fees within defense
organizations, the judges based their positions on application fees
on their hunches and observations about waiver of counsel by
indigent defendants. The discussion now turns to the available
statistical evidence about when such waivers occur.

138. State v. Tennin, No. A03-1281, 2003 Minn. LEXIS 639, at *1 (Minn. Sept. 24, 2003).
139. State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 410-11 (Minn. 2004).
140. The other provision, as noted above, is contained in Florida law, see supra note 28 and
accompanying text, and has yet to be challenged judicially.
141. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d at 408-09.
142. 417 U.S. 40 (1974). The Oregon law contained the equivalent of two waiver provisions;
one waiver opportunity arose at imposition, turning on a defendant's inability to reimburse,
and another after trial, should the defendant become unable to pay. See id. at 46.
143. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d at 410-11.
144. See supra notes 4-17 and accompanying text.
145. It is worthwhile to note that the institutional resistance to application fees surveyed
above is not unique to this particular reform effort. As noted in a recent ABA report, courts
often impose legal and procedural obstacles to the implementation of indigent defense reform
efforts. See BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 16, at 29 (providing examples of such obstacles).
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IV. FEES AND WAIVER RATES

Compelling reasons exist to believe that an application fee
could seriously affect a defendant's waiver decision, starting with
anecdotal evidence from attorneys and judges who report increases
in waivers after application fee statutes have taken effect. The field
actors themselves often assert during legislative debates that the
fees will induce and increase waivers. After the statutes take effect,
the trial actors believe that their predictions are coming true, as
more defendants appear to waive defense counsel.
For example, in North Carolina, a district court judge in Durham
County contended, three months after the fee statute took effect,
that he had noticed a decline in the number of people applying for
court-appointed lawyers.'46 Other misdemeanor court judges in the
state made similar comments,'47 echoing anecdotal reports from
defense attorneys from around the country. 4 '
Based on the operation of similar fees in settings other than
criminal justice, such expectations of waiver appear well justified.
For instance, when health insurance became dominated by copayments after the advent of managed care, serious effort went into
studying the behavior of consumers faced with increased copayments. 49 Instead of relying on aggregate statistics about the
total number of insurance policyholders, researchers utilized
surveys and other techniques to examine the choices of individual
consumers. 50 This empirical work shows that such up-front costs
can discourage many patients from seeking medical care.' 5 ' In light
of these data, practicing physicians (like their peer frontline actors
in criminal defense who resisted application fees) have criticized
146. See Fuchs, supra note 57 (stating that a Durham County District Court Judge "said
he noticed a decline in the number of people applying for court-appointed lawyers");
Associated Press, Indigents' Fee Upset Again, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 13,
2003, at B9 (same).
147. See Editorial, supranote 97 (noting that, although the amended statute had only been
in effect for less than four months, judges already "noticed the number of people applying for
court-appointed lawyers declining").
148. See supranotes 71-74 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Emmett B. Keeler, Effects of Cost Sharing on Use of Medical Services and
Health, 8 J. MED. PRAC. MGMT. 317, 317-18 (1992).
150. See id.

151. See id. at 318-19.
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recent efforts to increase medical insurance co-payments among the
poor, despite positions
to the contrary adopted by some in the
5 2
medical leadership.
The application fee debate, however, has lacked any analogous
empirical evidence. This dearth of consumer-level data is part of a
15 3
larger knowledge gap about the waiver of counsel more generally.
One commonly hears that waiver rates are quite low, but these
estimates are limited to felony cases. For instance, in the federal
system and in large urban counties in the state systems, the felony
waiver rate is reported at less than one percent."M Instances of
waiver are thus treated as anomalies, perhaps a result of mental
impairment among defendants or a breakdown in relations between
defendants and appointed counsel.' 5 5
But waiver is a closer question for misdemeanor defendants,
who face sanctions less severe than their felony counterparts, and
hence intuitively are more inclined to face the prosecutorial might
of the state on their own. This unpredictable waiver decision carries
serious consequences, both for the criminal justice system and for
the individuals involved. For the system, the financial stakes are
high because even though misdemeanor cases are less expensive to
152. See Robert Pear, DoctorsArgueAgainst HigherCo-Paymentsfor Medicaid,N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 2005, at A21 (discussing controversy surrounding the issue of whether the Medicaid
Commission should increase co-payments for the poor); see also Jonathan Klick & Thomas
Stratmann, How Sensitive Are Seniors to the Price of PrescriptionDrugs?(Fla. State Univ.
Coll. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 05-17), available at httpJ/papers.
ssrn.comlpaper.tafabstractid=766844 (finding that elderly Medicare beneficiaries are
sensitive to prescription drug price changes and not just insurance status).
153. See, e.g., Marie Higgins Williams, Comment, The Pro Se CriminalDefendant, Standby
Counsel, and the Judge: A Proposalfor Better-Defined Roles, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 815
(2000) (stating that U.S. criminal defendants proceed pro se "in an estimated fifty trials a
year," a vast underestimate); see also BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 16, at 28 (calling the lack
of reliable data on indigent defense "a significant barrier to identifying, evaluating, and
addressing structural deficiencies").
154. See HARIOW, supra note 13, at 1 (stating that in the seventy-five largest counties in
the United States in 1996, 0.4% of felony defendants in terminated cases waived available
defense counsel, and in the federal system, 0.3% of felons waived counsel).
155. See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES,
AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 702-09 (2d ed. 2003); see also Erica Hashimoto, Defending the
Right to Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant 32
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (finding that the overwhelming majority of pro
se federal felony defendants do not manifest signs of mental illness and that many opt to
represent themselves because of dissatisfaction with the perceived nature and quality of their
court-appointed counsel).
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prosecute than felonies, misdemeanor defendants significantly
outnumber felony defendants.' 56 A small shift in the percentage of
misdemeanor defendants who request appointed counsel could
overwhelm the system. For this reason alone, criminal justice
officials responsible for assembling a budget each year have every
reason to study closely the waiver choices of misdemeanor defendants.
The waiver decision also has major consequences for individual
defendants charged with misdemeanors. Sentencing law and
practice make a criminal record especially important in setting the
sentence for any future offense,5 7 influencing outcomes even when
no defense counsel worked on the case.' 58 Furthermore, the manifold
future consequences of a misdemeanor conviction often escape the
notice of a defendant who has no attorney,'5 9 an informational
deficit that goes unremedied by waiver procedural norms. 6 °
156. While national data on charging practices are not comprehensive, covering only parts
of the country, they make clear that charged misdemeanors vastly outnumber felonies. See
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

STATISTICS 2003, at 353 tbl.4.6 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 31st ed. 2003),
availableat http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t46.pdf (reflecting, based on proportional
national estimates, that in 2002 there were 2.3 million felony charges and over 9 million
misdemeanor charges).
157. See Wayne A. Logan, Civil and Criminal Recidivists: Extraterritorialityin Tort and

Crime, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 1609, 1618-20 (2005) (discussing the critical role historically played
by prior convictions in sentence enhancements).
158. This is categorically so in the event a valid waiver is secured. See Burgett v. Texas,
389 U.S. 109,114 (1967) (stating that the prosecution of an indigent for a felony is permissible
when a valid waiver of the right to counsel is secured). It is also so when an indigent is not
provided counsel to defend against a charge for which the right to counsel does not attach.
See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738,740-42 (1994) (holding that a prior conviction,
for which counsel was not provided because no jail time was imposed, can be used to enhance
a subsequent sentence).
159. Such deferred consequences are especially significant with regard to immigration. See
Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 DeportationLaws and the Limited
Scope ofProposedReforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1941-46 (2000) (noting a variety of minor

offense convictions that can result in deportation for resident aliens).
160. See BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 16, at 23-24 (noting the widespread practice of
failing to inform state misdemeanor defendants of their right to counsel). Consistent with this
recognition, waiver of counsel procedures for misdemeanors can be significantly less onerous
than for more serious charges. In Minnesota, for instance, individuals charged with felonies
and gross misdemeanors must be fully advised of numerous matters before waiver is deemed
valid, including facts "essential to a broad understanding of the consequences of the waiver
of the right to counsel." MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.02 subdiv. 1(4) (2005). With misdemeanors, on the
other hand, trial courts can find waiver if merely satisfied "that it is voluntary and has been

2080

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:2045

Despite these consequences, precious little data exist on waivers
of counsel in misdemeanor cases. Without a national repository of
comparable statistics,"' we are left with the strategy of sampling
court data from state systems. The state court data informing our
study suggest that waiver levels for misdemeanors are significantly
higher than for felonies. The waiver rates are also intriguingly fluid:
the percentage of defendants waiving counsel looks different from
state to state, and different from one year to the next.
From January 2000 to October 2005, the waiver rate in North
Carolina for those convicted of a felony was 3.3%, while the waiver
rate for those charged with a felony was 7.3%.162 Waivers of counsel
happened in 39.8% of all misdemeanor convictions during the
same period.'63 The trend for the most serious misdemeanors moved
up slightly, from 34.2% in 2000 to 35.9% in 2004.164 In Minnesota,
the waiver rate for serious felony defendants from 2000 to 2005 was
3.8%; for other felonies, 8.8%;165 and for gross misdemeanors,
made with the full knowledge and understanding of the defendant's rights." Id. subdiv. 1 (3);
cf William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in CriminalProcedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 762 (1989)
(noting the "tension between the breadth of the constitutional rights that protect [criminal]
defendants and the ease with which those rights may be waived").
161. The Bureau ofJustice Statistics, part of the U.S. Department ofJustice, has gathered
statistics on the processing of felony defendants in seventy-five large urban counties. See
HARLOW, supra note 13. With respect to misdemeanors, the Bureau provides data based on
survey samples only from local jails, reporting that 28% (in 1996) and 17% (in 1989) ofjailed
defendants had "no counsel," making it unclear whether waiver is specifically at play. Id. at
6 tbl.13.
For a proposal to give the federal government a leading role in securing criminal justice
data from different jurisdictions, see Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, "The Wisdom We
Have Lost". Sentencing Information and Its Uses, 58 STAN. L. REV. 361 (2005).
162. All the North Carolina waiver rates discussed in this Part are based on case-level data
maintained by the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts. The database records
in each case an "attorney type" indicating retained counsel, public defender, appointed
counsel, waiver, or the field is left blank. We exclude the blank cases from our calculations.
163. The misdemeanor waiver rate in North Carolina closely parallels estimates for
misdemeanors in the federal system. See HARLOW, supra note 13, at 1 (reporting a federal
misdemeanor waiver rate of 38.4%).
164. See infra tbl.2. The most serious misdemeanors in the North Carolina Criminal Code,
Class 1 misdemeanors, all carry the possibility of a jail term. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.23
(2003).
165. The Minnesota data include only convicted defendants, while the North Carolina data
include all defendants charged, whether they were ultimately convicted, acquitted, or had
their charges dismissed.
Note that the waiver rates for felonies reported from both Minnesota and North Carolina
are several times higher than the rates of 0.4% reported for felonies in the federal system and
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20.8%.166 As in North Carolina, the trend for the most serious

misdemeanor cases in Minnesota moved slightly up during this
period, from 20.1% to 24.8%.167

The arrival of the new application fee statutes in these two states
did not profoundly shift the waiver rates as reflected in these
aggregate court statistics. The misdemeanor waiver rate for counsel
in Minnesota did not spike up during the period (July 2003 through
January 2004) when the application fee statute was officially in
effect. Although the waiver rate did increase, as Table 1 reflects,
this was part of a small longer-term increase in the waiver rate,
both before and after the brief era of the application fee
extending
68
statute.1

in the seventy-five largest counties in the United States. See HARLOW, supra note 13, at 1. The
variation may reflect differences between urban jurisdictions and statewide averages for state
criminal courts, distinctive practices in North Carolina and Minnesota, or differences in
reporting techniques.
166. The waiver rates for Minnesota are calculated based on monthly county-level data
provided to the authors by the Minnesota Administrative Office of the Courts.
167. See infra tbl.1.
168. The calculations for the Minnesota table exclude cases from Hennepin County
(Minneapolis), which never fully implemented the application fee statute. Although Table 1
relies on statewide data (excluding Hennepin County) for July 2003 through January 2004,
we also calculated waiver rates for the two-month period, July through August, before
Hennepin County formally enjoined application of the law (by judicial ruling on September
3, 2003). The results were almost identical to those reflected in July through January period
contained in Table 1.
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Table 1
Minnesota Wiaver of Counsel, Misdemeanor Convictions
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Similarly, in North Carolina the waiver rate showed no sign of
increasing in response to the new application implemented between
December 2002 and January 2004.169 In fact, the rates for 2003,
when the fee law was in full effect, moved down for the most serious
(Class 1) misdemeanor cases, as well as for cases originally charged
as misdemeanors rather than felonies.

169. To account for the full period of the statute's operation, the North Carolina table
includes December 2002 and January 2004 in the 2003 calculation.
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Table 2
North Carolina Waiver of Counsel, Misdemeanor
Charges and Convictions
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We are left, then, with conflicting evidence: the observations of
the trial court actors, together with the carefully documented
behavior of consumers who encounter co-payments in other settings,
suggest that application fees should prompt higher levels of waiver
of defense counsel, especially in misdemeanor cases. On the other
hand, the court statistics from the two states studied do not reveal
an increase in the percentage of waiver cases during the periods
when the courts implemented the new application fee statutes.
What is the best way to reconcile the conflicting evidence about
the impact of the fee statutes on a defendant's decision to waive
counsel? A simple answer is possible. Perhaps the administrators of
indigent defense organizations who supported the application fees
were correct about the incentives for defendants: as they posited,
indigent defendants did not consider the fees to be large enough to
affect their waiver decisions.
In light of the anecdotal courtroom evidence and the known
behavior of consumers in the health insurance context, however, it
seems unlikely that fees in this context would not matter to
defendants. We believe that a better explanation starts with the
power of trial actors to blunt the effects of any new criminal justice
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policy, at least in the short run. In many criminal justice settings,
it appears that field-level actors can effectively slow down or
redirect changes that start at the top. For instance, sentencing
commissions know that support ("buy-in") from trial judges and
prosecutors is necessary-at least initially-if new sentencing rules
170
are to have any real effects on the pattern of sentences imposed.
Similarly, in the law enforcement realm, new policies (e.g., mandatory arrest for domestic abusers) often experience a lag in implementation, revealing a need for systematic training and persuasion
to ensure compliance by police.' 7 '
The same dynamic might give trial judges and defense attorneys
in the field a short-term veto power over the application fees. Trial
judges might prove quite generous in granting waivers, 172 or
otherwise effectively limit the reach of the application fee to
defendants who would have waived counsel anyway, keeping in
equilibrium the overall number of defendants who waive.
Putting aside the available formal power of the judiciary to waive
fees, judges have supervisory authority over court personnel who
collect the fees and can move slowly to establish procedures for
collection. 17 Judges in some jurisdictions hold the responsibility for
describing the fees to defendants, and could change the emphasis of
their descriptions in ways that might convince defendants to
minimize the practical importance of the fees. The same holds true
for defense attorneys: in jurisdictions where they collect the fees and
describe the fee options to potential clients, they hold the power to
downplay fees. 1 74 Even without the formal legal authority to waive
fees, in short, both trial judges and defense lawyers have some de
facto power over whether the defendant takes the potential cost
seriously.

170. See DALE G. PARENT, RESTRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF

MINNESOTA'S SENTENCING GUIDELINES 156-75 (Daniel J. Freed ed., 1989) (describing the
importance placed on judicial support of sentencing guidelines by the chair of the Minnesota
Sentencing Commission); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 167-69 (1996).
171. See G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and
the Conservatizationof the Battered Women's Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 279 (2005).
172. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
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Although some of these dampening effects could remain in place
for the long-term, they are especially effective in the short-term.
Because first trial and later appellate courts struck down the
application fee statutes in North Carolina and Minnesota, and the
constitutional status of the statutes remained doubtful for most of
the time they remained in effect, resistance among trial court actors
may have been especially significant.
Whether the systemwide counsel waiver statistics show that
application fees are too small to affect defendant choices about
waiver, or suggest instead that trial actors were able to blunt any
short-term effects from the application fees, the statistics also teach
a more profound lesson: the court data are not well suited to answer
the important questions about waiver. The people who matter most
here-the defendants-cannot be heard through aggregate statistics
about case processing.
Although court processing statistics contain the best information
currently collected and made available to the public about waiver of
counsel, they fall short of informing us what we need to know about
this question. Court statistics give more detailed accounts of felony
defendants, even though misdemeanor defendants make the waiver
decisions with the largest volume effects on the criminal justice
budget. The reported statistics concentrate on the crime of conviction rather than the crime charged at the time of the waiver
decision, thus losing much information about the connection
between plea bargaining and waiver of counsel.
The numbers also miss important differences among counties and
among different courtrooms in the same county. If judges and
defense attorneys in one locality downplay the application fees or
discourage their collection, statewide averages muffle those
differences. The same is true for variations in the coverage of the
right to counsel. Because the sentence to be imposed after a criminal
conviction triggers a right to counsel at the start of the case, trial
judges must predict which crimes are likely to result in jail terms,
thus requiring an offer of appointed defense counsel. Although
different judges might answer this question differently and change
the waiver rate accordingly, court system data do not capture this
variation.
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In the end, court personnel collect and categorize their data for
purposes other than understanding the choices of criminal defendants. The information we need should track the waiver decisions
of individual defendants, including the reasons they offer at the
time for their choices. 175 Survey techniques could also estimate the
likely behavior of defendants faced with various hypothetical fee
arrangements. Given the amount of money the public invests in
indigent criminal defense, and the serious effect that waiver rates
can have on the cost and effectiveness of that expensive system, the
least we can do is gather data that are suited to the question.
CONCLUSION

Even though publicly funded indigent defense is considered an
"unavoidable consequence" of our adversarial system, 176 and despite
the constitutional sensitivity of granting criminal justice benefits
based on the capacity of indigents to pay, 177 states in recent years
have turned to indigent criminal defendants themselves to help
cover the ever-increasing costs of their defense. With application
fees, state legislators found a way to defray the costs of indigent
defense and situate themselves within the broader politically
popular "pay-as-you-go" movement sweeping the nation.
The political economy of application fees, however, has greater
nuance than kindred reform efforts. In response to intense political
pressure to control the costs of criminal defense organizations, the
leaders of these organizations themselves very often propose the use
of fees. The leadership strategically aligns itself with prosecutorial
and other typically antidefense interests in legislative debates.
While ultimately successful in political terms, the strategy creates
a rift within the indigent defense infrastructure, prompting rank175. To this end, an effort was made to examine a random sample of case files of
individuals who waived counsel in several Minnesota counties. Unfortunately, the
approximately three dozen files examined contained no information whatsoever on the
reasons for waiver. For a preliminary effort in this vein, focusing on federal court records and
shedding some light on the question, see Hashimoto, supra note 155.
176. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 378 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
177. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (invalidating state law that conditioned
access to trial transcripts on appellant-defendants' ability to pay); see also Bearden v. Georgia,
461 U.S. 660, 664 (1983) ("This Court has long been sensitive to the treatment of indigents
in our criminal justice system.").
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and-file public defenders to challenge the laws on legal and
constitutional grounds in the name of their individual indigent
clients.
Perhaps the arguments play out this way inevitably. Given their
institutional starting points, the leadership will surely endorse
techniques that save program resources, especially if much of the
cost falls on those potential clients who never enter the program.
Similarly, the appointed lawyers and public defenders at the trial
level are wont to defend reflexively the principle of individual access
to justice. For both sides, what individual clients actually believe or
do about the fees may be beside the point, for it has no effect on
their argument of principle.
This Article has undertaken the first steps toward understanding
defendant decisions to waive counsel. Statewide court data from
Minnesota and North Carolina fail to reveal any impact on waiver
rates when those states enacted application fee statutes. This
statewide pattern might show that defendants place a higher value
on defense counsel than the amount of the application fee, or it
could reflect the efforts of trial judges and defense lawyers to spare
the defendants from such choices. We are more inclined to believe
the latter, because it fits with the often-observed power of trial
actors to dampen the effects of criminal justice policy changes
imposed from the top, especially in the short-run.
More importantly, our preliminary survey of aggregate court
statistics points to a need for different measurement techniques: the
gathering of case-level information that captures local courtroom
variety and the reasoning of individual defendants. We have until
now failed to grasp the huge impact of counsel waiver for the quality
and cost of criminal justice. Listening in the right places will help
us hear the answers from criminal defendants themselves.

